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Inspired by Peter van Inwagen’s “simulacra model” of the resurrection, 
I investigate whether it could be reasonable to adopt an analogous approach 
to the problem of evil. Empirically Skeptical Theism, as I call it, is the hypoth-
esis that God shields our lives from irredeemable evils surreptitiously (just 
as van Inwagen proposes that God shields our bodies from destruction sur-
reptitiously). I argue that EST compares favorably with traditional skeptical 
theism and with eschatological theodicies, and that EST does not have the 
negative moral consequences we might suppose.
1. Introduction: The van Inwagen Strategy
As a Christian physicalist, Peter van Inwagen must find a way to reconcile 
the following triad of propositions—one philosophical, one empirical, and 
one theological:
1) “If a man does not simply die but is totally destroyed (as in the case of 
cremation) then he can never be reconstituted, even as an accomplish-
ment of God.”1
2) “Men apparently cease to exist: those who are cremated, for example.”2
3) “One day all or most dead men [including those who apparently 
cease to exist] will be restored to life by God.”3
There is, of course, no strict inconsistency here, because (2) states only 
that there are people who apparently cease to exist. So long as one is willing 
to entertain a certain skeptical doubt about the world—namely the doubt 
that the appearances reported by (2) are veridical—one need not abandon 
either the philosophical commitment of (1) or the theological commitment 
of (3). This is, in fact, exactly what van Inwagen does. He advances the 
hypothesis that God, through a simple exercise of divine power, shields 
our bodies from destruction and decay contrary to all appearance: “per-
haps at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his corpse and 
replaces it with a simulacrum which is what is burned or rots.”4
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1van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 119.
2van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 121.
3van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 116.
4van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 121.
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My purpose is to investigate whether it would be reasonable for a theist 
to deploy a parallel strategy in the context of the problem of evil. More 
specifically, I have in mind the problem of horrors or horrendous evils, 
construed primarily as an evidential rather than logical problem of evil.5 
Horrors, as I shall use the term, are inscrutable, excessive, or dysteleologi-
cal evils—evils for which our best current theodicies can provide no plau-
sible explanation or account of their utility. Horrors are evils for which 
there would appear, even in light of our best current theodicies, to be no 
sufficient reason for God to allow them to occur.6
Evils might qualify as horrors for a variety of reasons, depending on 
what theodicies we regard as our best. My purposes in this paper do not 
require me to take a firm position on which theodicies these are, but as 
we will see I do think that Irenaean or “soul-making” theodicies of the 
general sort that John Hick articulates—those according to which the 
evil in the world enables “the realizing of the most valuable potentiali-
ties of human personality”7—provide the strongest rationale for why God 
would be motivated to act in the unconventional ways I will discuss. If, 
for example, we regard soul-making theodicies as our best, then we are 
most likely to regard as horrors those evils which, in Hick’s words, are 
“so severe as to be self-defeating when considered as soul-making influ-
ences” or which “reach far beyond any constructive function of character 
training.”8 Naturally he has various proposals for dealing with such evils 
which seem to lie beyond the scope of his theodicy, but the point at this 
juncture is that even a fairly optimistic theist must find a way to reconcile 
the following triad of propositions—one philosophical, one empirical, and 
one theological:
(1) If there is a God, there are no horrors.
(2) There appear to be horrors.
(3) There is a God.
As with van Inwagen’s triad of propositions, there is no strict inconsist-
ency here because (2) states only that there appear to be horrors (and if we 
construe premise 1 as an evidential rather than logical claim, as we prob-
ably should, there is no strict inconsistency at all). Regardless of whether 
we construe (1) in logical or evidential terms, so long as one is willing to 
entertain a certain skeptical doubt about the world—namely the doubt 
AQ7
5While EST-style maneuvers could in principle be deployed to provide a defense against 
the logical problem of evil (e.g., by suggesting that all apparent evils are illusions maintained 
by God), this seems to me to involve empirical skepticism of a clearly unacceptable scope.
6Importantly, I am not using Marilyn Adams’s more famous definitions of horrendous 
evils: “Evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima 
facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on 
the whole” (Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 299) or for which “we 
cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile 
lives for human participants in them” (304).
7Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” 170.
8Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” 183.
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that the appearances reported by (2) are veridical—one need not abandon 
either the philosophical commitment of (1) or the theological commitment 
of (3). This is, in fact, exactly what skeptical theists, in general contrast 
with theodicists, do. Skeptical theists typically argue that the limits of our 
cognitive abilities and/or our epistemic vantage point entail that “we are 
in no position to judge whether there are pointless evils on the basis of 
inscrutable evils.”9 Some skeptical theists challenge whether we are even 
entitled to (2) in the first place,10 but in any case the central claim is that 
there is something inherently deficient about our ability to properly eval-
uate the moral status of the evils in question. I shall hereafter refer to any 
such approach to the problem of evil as Morally Skeptical Theism, or MST.
MST questions our ability to know whether the apparent horrors in the 
world really are pointless or gratuitous, but it does not question whether 
the particular evil events that appear to occur do in fact occur. In order to 
preserve a closer parallelism with van Inwagen’s approach to resurrec-
tion, therefore, I propose a different brand of skeptical theism which I shall 
term Empirically Skeptical Theism, or EST. EST is a family of responses to 
the problem of evil unified by the hypothesis that God, through a sim-
ple exercise of divine power, shields our lives from horrors contrary to all 
appearance. The mechanism(s) by which God accomplishes this feat may 
vary (just as van Inwagen acknowledges they may vary in the simulacra 
case), and it is not my purpose to settle questions about these details. 
For illustration, consider the following, keeping in mind that EST can 
be tailored to suit whatever set of evils our best theodicies are otherwise 
at a loss to explain: Perhaps at the moment when the suffering a person 
experiences reaches a point where it can no longer serve any construc-
tive function for soul-making, God temporarily “anesthetizes” him or her 
while leaving intact the outward appearance (and subsequent memories) 
of suffering. Perhaps God surreptitiously replaces those who appear to 
suffer the dissolution of personality or the permanent breaking of spirit 
with p-zombies. When William Rowe asks us to imagine the prolonged 
suffering of a fawn trapped in a forest fire, arguing that “an omnipotent 
being could have easily spared the fawn the intense suffering by quickly 
ending its life, rather than allowing the fawn to lie in terrible agony for 
several days,”11 the empirically skeptical theist replies that perhaps God 
did quickly end its life, leaving in its place a fawn simulacrum which burns 
and writhes instead. When David Lewis points out that God could permit 
thought crime without permitting action crime by placing his creatures in 
a “playpen” that prevents them from harming each other,12 the EST replies 
that perhaps we are in a playpen—just one whose safeguards are invisible 
9Dougherty, “Skeptical Theism,” 3.1. Note that this is simply one construal of the position, 
namely Dougherty’s (who is not himself a skeptical theist). Like EST, MST is best thought of 
as a family of strategies.
10See Dougherty, “Skeptical Theism,” 2.1.
11Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 337.
12Lewis, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?” 154.
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to us. When David Hume complains (to use Hick’s wording) that “God 
should interfere secretly and on special occasions to prevent exceptional 
and excessive evils,”13 the EST agrees wholeheartedly—and suggests that 
this is exactly what God does.
To the best of my knowledge, there are only two examples of propos-
als in the spirit of EST to appear in recent literature. The first is from Nick 
Bostrom. He considers the possibility that the mental lives of simulated 
beings are abridged by their simulators, who “giv[e] them false memories 
of the sort of experiences that they would typically have had during the 
omitted interval.”14 He dismisses as “farfetched” a solution to the problem 
of evil based on such abridgement, presumably because he only considers 
one according to which all memories of suffering are illusions. The second 
is from Eleonore Stump. She points out in passing, but does not endorse, 
the possibility that God prevented children who were the victims of Old 
Testament massacres from suffering in the process of dying.15 Like Stump, 
I will stop short of endorsing any such proposal. I will argue, however, that 
EST compares favorably with MST and with theodicies which depend on 
eschatological goods to explain or defeat horrendous evils. Ultimately there 
are three main options for the conclusion we may draw from my discussion:
(1) EST is absurd, and backfires on the theist. EST is both the reductio 
ad absurdum of the van Inwagen strategy for reconciling empirical 
and religious beliefs, and a scathing indictment of those alternative 
theories with which it favorably compares.
(2) EST is improbable, but still a valuable addition to the theodicist’s 
toolbox. EST can be helpfully deployed as a provisional or stopgap 
measure where other strategies fall short.
(3) EST is probable. In fact, it describes exactly how we should expect 
God to act if God is interested in maximizing the world’s soul-mak-
ing potential while minimizing unnecessary suffering.
My own position is (2), and this is the most that I will defend. As I will 
explain, I believe that the plausibility of EST crucially depends upon how 
strong we take our extant theodicies to be. This is because the stronger 
our extant theodicies are, the more narrowly EST can be deployed. Since 
I am generally optimistic about the strength of our extant theodicies, I am 
optimistic that EST can be deployed without, for example, leading to per-
vasive doubts about the external world.
Lastly, I will consider the charge that EST is not merely implausible but 
offensive—morally inappropriate to apply within pastoral contexts and 
perhaps even to entertain in the abstract. While EST may indeed be unsuit-
able for most pastoral contexts, I will argue that there is precedent for the 
pastoral use of relevantly similar views in some religious and theological 
13Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” 180.
14Bostrom, “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?” 254.
15Stump, “The Problem of Evil and the History of Peoples,” 183.
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traditions. Moreover, a willingness to entertain EST actually bespeaks a 
greater sensitivity to the moral gravity of horrendous evils than does the 
willingness to entertain other theistic options.
2. Comparative Degrees of Skepticism
Merely that a theory supposes the world to be quite different than it ini-
tially or outwardly appears is not, by itself, a reason to reject that theory. 
Even in the hard sciences it is now commonplace for us to discover that 
things are not as they appear, whether in as simple a case as the apparently 
flat earth turning out to be round or in as complex a case as apparently 
solid objects turning out to be extremely sparse clouds of micro-physi-
cal particles. Contrariety to appearances, therefore, is not all by itself a 
sufficient objection to EST. That said, there are presumably limits to the 
amount of empirical skepticism which is admissible in any given context. 
It is also presumably the case that, all else being equal, we should favor 
theories which comport with appearances.
Van Inwagen believes that in the case of his resurrection theory, all else 
is not equal. He argues that God would have a vested interest in disguis-
ing the preservation of our corpses because of a broader divine interest 
in keeping the supernatural hidden from human beings.16 Obviously, 
the plausibility of this particular argument depends on the plausibility 
of divine hiddenness having some desirable quality. The point for our 
purposes, however, is that skeptical hypotheses can be warranted to the 
extent that we are warranted in supposing that there is an agent who is 
able to maintain the illusion in question and who would be motivated to 
do so. Since there is no question of an omnipotent being’s ability either to 
perform the necessary feats for EST or to keep these activities a secret—or 
at least, no more question than there is for the simulacra model or various 
other kinds of miraculous interventions—all we have to do is supply a 
plausible motive.
Is it reasonable to think that a benevolent God would be motivated to 
act in the sorts of ways outlined by EST? Certainly, if for no other reason 
than that it is a way to limit or even eliminate unnecessary suffering—
and this while leaving intact the world’s soul-making potential and our 
responsibility for one another. EST enables us to satisfy Hume’s demand 
that the evils in a world designed for soul-making be “so accurately 
adjusted as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility 
consists.”17 If it is reasonable to suppose that the world should contain 
these sorts of safeguards, it is also reasonable to suppose that these safe-
guards would not be visible to the beings for whose soul-making God 
created the world. This is because it is highly plausible that the mere 
appearance of another person suffering would provide the same opportu-
nity for one to respond in praiseworthy or blameworthy ways as would 
16van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 121.
17Hume, Dialogues and Natural History of Religion, 11.11.
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an instance of actual suffering, provided one cannot tell the difference. 
Likewise, at least on many deontological views of ethics, EST does not 
jeopardize our ordinary moral duties or undermine the moral significance 
of our choices for the simple reason that we do not know that it is true.18 
As Lewis writes of the aforementioned playpen scenario, “Stalin needn’t 
have known the playpen was there. Insofar as the intrinsic character of 
Stalin and his evil deeds went, the playpen needn’t have made the slight-
est difference.”19 Furthermore, we need not conclude that God would be 
an immoral deceiver if he acted in surreptitious ways to reduce suffering: 
“At worst He misleads us, permitting us to jump rashly to a false conclu-
sion. And maybe not even that. Why shouldn’t we be able to figure out 
that [a given strategy] is a good strategy for God—if indeed it is—and con-
clude that God may well be following it?”20 In the case of horrors, just as 
in science, there are reasonable methods by which we can come to doubt 
or abandon our common-sense beliefs—and I, for one, would be relieved 
and grateful (rather than angry and indignant) were I to learn that God 
acts in the ways EST supposes.
Even accepting that soul-making theodicy provides a plausible motive 
for God to act in these ways given that we perceive horrors, we might 
still wonder why there should be even the appearance of horrors if the 
non-horrific evil in the world is more than enough to give us the oppor-
tunities for moral choices and soul-making growth that God supposedly 
wants. Unless there is something special about our human response to 
apparently horrific evil as opposed to apparently non-horrific evil, the 
mere appearance of horrors is still mysterious. As it happens, I think that 
there is something special about how we choose to respond in the face of 
apparent horrors. This is because I, like Hick, am inclined to think that 
the greatest kinds of spiritual growth come from contending not merely 
with the presence of evil but with the specter of nihilism. Humanity, Ralph 
Emerson has told us, is won by continuing to fight on in the face of certain 
defeat; and it is only Faust’s decision to strive to live a moral life in spite 
of believing that he will be damned which develops his character in the way 
necessary to prevent his damnation. To this point, Hick writes:
The mystery of dysteleological suffering is a real mystery, impenetrable to 
the rationalizing human mind. It challenges Christian faith with its utterly 
baffling, alien, destructive meaninglessness. And yet at the same time, 
detached theological reflection can note that this very irrationality and this 
lack of ethical meaning contribute to the character of the world as a place in 
which true human goodness can occur and in which loving sympathy and 
18John Pittard has pointed out to me that taking EST seriously could have some conse-
quences “at the margins” of moral decision-making, e.g., slightly inclining the priorities of 
medical researchers away from trying to cure the most horrific diseases and towards trying 
to cure the only moderately horrific diseases instead (if and when we are unable to do both). 
This is a bullet I am prepared to bite.
19Lewis, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?” 154.
20Lewis, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?” 162–163.
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compassionate self-sacrifice can take place. Thus, paradoxically, the failure 
of theism to solve all mysteries becomes part of its case.21
To return to the point that there are limits to the amount of empirical skep-
ticism admissible in any given context, I agree. It would be profoundly 
misguided, for example, to use EST against the logical problem of evil 
by supposing that no evil ever occurs at all or to use it against the basic 
evidential problem of evil by casting widespread doubt on the existence 
of other sentient creatures. This is why I have chosen to focus on EST’s 
application to a narrow range of the most horrendous evils; skepticism 
should not be allowed to multiply unnecessarily. Is even such a limited 
skepticism as this profoundly misguided? Perhaps; I cannot presume here 
to determine precisely what it is that governs the limits of philosophically 
acceptable empirical skepticism. Even so, I can endeavor to show that EST 
requires no more skepticism than some of the alternative responses to the 
problem of horrors.
Consider the eschatological dimension of many theodicies. Hick, for 
example, thinks that any soul-making theodicy “must be eschatological 
in its ultimate bearings”22 and include, in Trakakis’s words, “a universal-
ist eschatology that extends the soul-making process beyond the grave.”23 
Marilyn Adams also embraces a universalist eschatology, one in which 
God ensures that each and every evil a person experiences in life will be 
“defeated” in a future state of beatific union with God by being incorpo-
rated organically into a life which is a great good for that person on the 
whole. Richard Swinburne and Eleonore Stump, though not universalists, 
still rely heavily on the great goodness and/or justice of a future eschato-
logical state to help offset and/or explain the evils of the present world, as 
do many others. All these philosophers recognize that there just is not any 
reasonable hope of reconciling evil in all its forms with the existence of 
God unless the world is different in important ways from how it appears. 
This is because any hope we might have for future universal justice and 
redemption of evils goes beyond the experienced order of nature. In our 
experience, evils (whether horrendous or not) appear to be left unredeemed 
all the time; as the Psalmist laments (73:1–14), the righteous suffer and the 
wicked prosper. More to the point, it is contrary to the experienced order 
of nature that people continue to exist after death, which is a requirement 
if they are to partake in any of the transcendent and redeeming goods that 
a religious believer might suppose will obtain in a future state. Adams 
may be absolutely right that “the good of beatific, face-to-face intimacy 
with God is simply incommensurate with any merely non-transcendent 
goods or ills a person might experience,”24 but believing that such good 
will ever come to pass requires significant empirical skepticism. As I hope 
21Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” 187.
22Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” 173.
23Trakakis, “Theodicy: The Solution or Part of the Problem?” 166.
24Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 306.
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is clear, I am not suggesting that religious beliefs in life after death cannot 
be justified in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary. My point is 
simply that religious beliefs in life after death conflict with appearances 
in the same way EST does, and so whatever evidence we might be able 
to muster for life after death on the basis of the existence and goodness 
of God should also function as evidence for EST. After all, it would be no 
more difficult for an omnipotent and omniscient being to surreptitiously 
prevent horrors than it would be for such a being to ensure the immortal-
ity and future bliss of human beings.
It may perhaps be objected that there is an important difference between 
theories which go against the experienced order of nature and those which 
merely go beyond the experienced order of nature. Perhaps it is one thing 
for appearances to be mistaken, and quite another for appearances to be 
merely unrepresentative of the entire universe. I  accept that this is an 
important distinction (e.g., when a scientist happens to collect an unrepre-
sentative sample), but I do not think that it applies when comparing EST 
to eschatological theodicies. While this may be a matter of dispute, I fol-
low van Inwagen in being committed to the proposition “people appar-
ently cease to exist,” and I see this proposition as a perceptual datum on 
a par with “there appear to be horrors.” For those unwilling to follow me 
in asserting that “people apparently cease to exist” I  will simply point 
out that there have been contemporary philosophers of religion willing to 
entertain other responses to evil which plainly go against the experienced 
order of nature. I am here thinking especially of Alvin Plantinga entertain-
ing the theory that natural disasters are attributable to demonic activity.25
Consider second how the empirical skepticism of EST compares to the 
moral skepticism of MST. The latter holds that we have reason to doubt 
the reliability of our moral perceptions; we are in no position to judge 
whether horrendous evils are or could be justified as part of God’s plans. 
Such moral skepticism, Stewart Sutherland thinks, is a grave form of skep-
ticism indeed—one which, he argues, is too great a price to pay. He writes,
The defeat of horrendous evil requires a significant qualification of the initial 
moral perceptions and commitments which lead to the classification of evils 
as horrendous evils. That is to say, the individual must in the end come to 
the view that viewed in a proper light horrendous evils are not so bad after 
all.26
He goes on to ask whether it is reasonable to think that a benevolent 
God would willfully behave in ways that undermine the integrity of our 
human moral perceptions, and the intuitive answer is no.27 His arguments 
are here directed at Marilyn Adams’s theodicy—which is not an example 
of MST because Adams thinks Christians have at least some idea of how 
25See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 58.
26Sutherland, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 317.
27I would here add that, in my own opinion, God willfully deceives us more on the MST 
hypothesis (if only by lies of omission) than on the EST hypothesis.
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God could defeat even the worst of evils—but they apply equally to MST. 
This is because Sutherland’s indignation is based on the fact that whatever 
it is that God may do to defeat horrendous evil, for us to even be able to 
recognize it as a successful defeat of horrendous evil would require a rad-
ical shift in our moral perceptions to take place.
Could our moral perceptions really be as flawed as MST requires? The 
answer, I think, is yes. Like Lewis, “I myself think that a false value judge-
ment, however preposterous, is possibly true.”28 That is not, however, the 
relevant question. The relevant question is whether it could ever be more 
reasonable to believe that our moral perceptions are as flawed as MST 
requires than to believe that our empirical judgements are as flawed as 
EST requires. The answer to this question, I think, is no. As confident as 
I may be in the reliability of my empirical judgements, I find myself more 
certain that allowing a child to be tortured is unjustifiable than that a child 
ever actually experiences the torture it appears to. There is more room for 
doubt in our sense perceptions of horrors than in our moral perceptions of 
horrors, and thus the skepticism of EST is to be preferred to the skepticism 
of MST. To those who think moral perceptions are inherently less reliable 
than sense perceptions, Robert Adams writes the following:
It may be suggested that the epistemological status of moral beliefs is so far 
inferior to that of physical beliefs, for example, that any moral belief found 
to entail the existence of an otherwise unknown object ought simply to be 
abandoned. But in spite of the general uneasiness about morality that per-
vades our culture, most of us do hold many moral beliefs with almost the 
highest degree of confidence. So long as we think it reasonable to argue at 
all from grounds that are not absolutely certain, there is no clear reason why 
such confident beliefs, in ethics as in other fields, should not be accepted 
as premises in arguing for the existence of anything that is required for the 
most satisfactory theory of their subject matter.29
If one should remain unconvinced that EST involves less skepticism than 
MST, so be it. They are not mutually exclusive strategies, because the 
doubt about the existence of horrors stemming from moral skepticism and 
empirical skepticism is cumulative. The morally skeptical theist can still 
welcome EST as an adjunct and complementary strategy.
Rowan Williams writes that “Perhaps it is time for philosophers of reli-
gion to look away from theodicy—not to appeal blandly to the mysterious 
purposes of God, not to appeal to any putative justification at all, but to 
put the question of how we remain faithful to human ways of seeing suf-
fering.”30 I do not share Williams’s pessimism about the value of theodicy. 
As I see it, the more evils for which our theodicies can provide a plausi-
ble explanation (i.e., the smaller the number of horrors there are), the less 
skepticism EST requires and the more plausible it becomes. I  do agree, 
AQ8
28Lewis, “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?” 152.
29Adams, “Moral Arguments for God’s Existence,” 232.
30Williams, “Redeeming Sorrows,” 147.
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however, that we should remain as faithful as possible to human ways of 
seeing suffering, even as we work to improve our theodicies. Fortunately, 
EST is consistent with this objective. While the morally skeptical theist 
says, “for all we know, our moral perceptions will change dramatically 
once we see the world from God’s point of view,” the empirically skeptical 
theist says, “for all we know, they won’t even have to.”
3. The Pastoral Objection to Empirically Skeptical Theism
A potential problem for my proposal is that it appears to be a truly spectacular 
violation of the principles of pastoral applicability and moral sensitivity for 
theodicy articulated by Irving Greenberg, Kenneth Surin, Nick Trakakis, and 
others.31 These principles are best summarized in Greenberg’s assertion that 
“No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be 
credible in the presence of burning children,”32 and in Surin’s assertion that the 
“incapacity to acknowledge that a particular reality is mind-stopping betokens 
an irremissible moral blindness.”33 Would EST be credible in the presence of 
burning children? At least prima facie, it would be not only incredible but offen-
sive, amounting to a denialism of the worst kind. Only imagine, for example, 
the reaction one would likely meet if one were to tell victims of post-traumatic 
stress disorder that they merely seem to remember their original traumas.
The point is well-taken, insofar as we would generally do well to avoid 
appealing to EST in pastoral settings. However, against the charge that 
EST is morally insensitive in the manner Surin describes, I must protest. 
An incapacity to acknowledge that a particular reality is mind-stopping 
might betoken an irremissible moral blindness, but this is exactly what 
EST does acknowledge. The reality in question is so mind-stopping, so 
inexplicable in human ethical terms, that the empirically skeptical theist 
would rather trust that God is working behind the scenes to ensure that 
things are not as bad as they seem than accept the evils as they appear and 
attempt to rationalize them as part of a divine plan. What response from 
a theist is there, I ask, which could demonstrate a greater sensitivity to the 
overwhelming gravity of the world’s most horrendous evils?
Furthermore, I observe that there are responses to evil in extant religious 
and theological traditions that seem (at least from my perspective) to be 
relevantly similar to EST with respect to their pastoral significance (though 
not, of course, with respect to their philosophical content). In particular, 
there are texts within various eastern religious traditions which appear to 
me to make quite a lot of the idea that suffering is in an important sense 
an illusion or grounded in an illusion (e.g., the illusion of self).34 I claim no 
31E.g., David Bentley Hart: “words we would not utter to ease another’s grief we ought 
not to speak to satisfy our own sense of piety” (Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 99).
32Trakakis, “Theodicy,” 161.
33Trakakis, “Theodicy,” 174.
34See, for example, Buddha’s four noble truths, the Zhuangzi (ch. 2), and The Bhagavad Gita 
2.14–15, 2.38, 6.32, 12.13, 12.18, 14.24–25.
333EMPIRICALLY SKEPTICAL THEISM
expertise whatsoever in these traditions, but such treatments of suffering 
have not, so far as I am aware, proven to undermine pastoral care.
Finally, I  think it is incumbent upon Greenberg et al. to show why—
more exactly—philosophical approaches to the problem of evil must 
always and everywhere be constrained by how emotionally distressed 
people are likely to react to them. Epicurus famously wrote “Vain is the 
word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man,” yet the 
truth does not always comfort—nor should it. As van Inwagen writes,
If a child dies on the operating table in what was supposed to be a routine 
operation and a board of medical enquiry finds that the death was due to 
some factor that the surgeon could not have anticipated and that the surgeon 
was not at fault, that finding will be of no comfort to the child’s parents. But 
it is not the purpose of a board of medical enquiry to comfort anyone; the 
purpose of a board of medical enquiry is, by examining the facts of the mat-
ter, to determine whether anyone was at fault.35
In just the same way, it is not always the purpose of philosophy of religion 
to help people find meaning in suffering. I sincerely hope and believe that 
in some cases it does, and obviously philosophy of religion is a discipline 
which can be conducted in a great diversity of ways by different people. 
In my own capacity as a theodicist, however, I am first and foremost God’s 
lawyer—not God’s ambassador.
4. Conclusion: A Division of Labor
Van Inwagen states that the proposition that the world contains vast 
amounts of horrendous evil “is not open to reasonable doubt.”36 Why he 
should think that the reality of horrendous evils is not open to reasonable 
doubt when the reality of cremated bodies is open to reasonable doubt is 
not clear. Illusions of both kinds would be equally easy for an omnipotent 
and omniscient being to maintain, and soul-making theodicy provides 
at least as strong a rationale for God maintaining the illusion of horren-
dous evils as van Inwagen provides for God maintaining the illusion of 
human beings ceasing to exist. If van Inwagen’s strategy for resurrection 
is warranted in the absence of a better alternative, then EST should be 
warranted, mutatis mutandis, in the absence of a better alternative.
As I  stated in my introduction, I  believe that EST, while unlikely, 
should be taken seriously as a useful tool when other strategies fall 
short. More specifically, I believe that taking EST seriously enables an 
interesting division of labor, one which has implications for how we 
structure our inquiry into theodicy: EST and theodicy should, so to 
speak, divide and conquer. Rather than make the most inscrutable hor-
rors their highest priority, theodicists should make the most frequent 
or recurrent horrors their highest priority. This is because it is no more 
35van Inwagen, “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils,” 77.
36van Inwagen, “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils,” 67.
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difficult for God to surreptitiously prevent the most horrific instance of 
evil in the world than to surreptitiously prevent the stubbing of one’s 
toe. The total amount of empirical skepticism EST requires, therefore, 
depends less on the magnitude of the evils our best theodicies are at a 
loss on their own to explain and more on the number of evils our best 
theodicies are at a loss on their own to explain.37 EST would be emi-
nently reasonable if, for example, there were only a single apparent 
instance of evil that had so far withstood our theodicies. Faced with 
only one remaining horror, I think many philosophers of religion would 
be tempted to adopt (at least provisionally) a skeptical hypothesis about 
it. In short, the job of EST should be to relieve the pressure on theodicy 
to explain the magnitude of evils in the world while the job of theodicy 
should be to relieve the pressure on EST to explain the number of evils 
in the world. The relationship is synergistic, and each should attend to 
the task for which it is best equipped.
I tentatively suggest, given the division of labor that I  have just 
described, that the evils of trauma and PTSD ought—if they are not 
already—to be among the theodicists’s highest priorities. EST does not 
necessarily involve the kind of anaesthetization and subsequent manipu-
lation of memory that I described in my introduction, but this is certainly 
a simple model and one which might satisfy a “principle of minimal inter-
ference” for evil-limiting divine interventions.38 On this model, however, 
cases where the memory of a horror is itself a horror—as is plausibly the 
case with at least some flashbacks or other traumatic memories—pose a 
particular challenge. We are free in principle, of course, to simply reapply 
EST-style maneuvers to each of the recurrent horrific episodes. However, 
doing so could multiply dramatically the number of events about which 
we have to be skeptical. The plausibility of EST increases if the theodicist 
can help the empirically skeptical theist avoid having to redeploy it in this 
way.39
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